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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION©
By TERENCE G. 1SON*
Workers' compensation has entered a period of rising
complexity and increasing pressures for system change.
This article explains the extent to which important
assumptions and assertions made in this process are
historically correct. The discussion includes the
historical interaction of tort liability with workers'
compensation, and the current proposals for
"privatization."
Le r6gime des accidents du travail franchit
pr6sentement une nouvelle phase remplie de
complexit6s et de pressions croissantes visant sa
modification. Cet article explique dans quelle mesure
les arguments soutenus A cet effet sont justifi6s d'un
point de vue historique. Entre autres, ]a prdsente
discussion traite de l'interaction traditionnelle entre la
responsibilit6 extra-contractuelle et les accidents du
travail, ainsi que des projets de privatisation de ce
r6gime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly forgotten what a unique contribution Sir William
Meredith made to public administration in Canada, as well as to social
insurance and labour relations, and particularly to our legal structure.
Until fairly recent years, almost all of our law was drawn from
England, though a substantial proportion of Quebec law was drawn from
France. It was not until the 1960s that there began to emerge on any
broad scale a distinctly Canadian jurisprudence, and a body of Canadian
legal thought.
To that general picture, there was an outstanding exception. In
1913, we introduced a major change in our legal structure. We did it in a
way that was out of character for the time. We used our own
imagination. We devised a new legal regime that drew features from
Britain, from Germany, and from some of the United States; but a
substantial dose of native imagination was added to the mix to produce a
new legal regime that was indigenously Canadian.- This was done
through the appointment by the government of Ontario of a Royal
Commission conducted by Sir William Meredith, the Chief Justice of
Ontario. The system of workers' compensation that he recommended/
was adopted with very little change by the Ontario Legislature, 2 and
subsequently copied with modifications in all jurisdictions of Canada.
1 Hon. Sir. W.R. Meredith, Final Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers: to Make
Compensation to their Employees for Injuries received in the course of their employment, which are in
force in other countries (Toronto: L.K Cameron, 1913), (reprinted 1989), [hereinafter Meredith
Report].
2 An Act to provide for Compensation to Workmen for Injuries sustained and industrial Diseases
contracted in the course of their Employment, S.O. 1914, c. 25 [hereinafter Workmen's Compensation
Act].
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The system that Meredith designed also became unique in
another way. As far as I can recall, workers' compensation is the only
legal subject in which a system was designed in Canada and subsequently
adopted in other countries. This came home to me a few years ago when
I was invited to speak at a conference on workers' compensation in
South Africa. While there, I called at the office of the Compensation
Commissioner in Pretoria. Above his desk was a portrait picture of
Meredith. I asked him why. He explained that when the first Workmen's
Compensation Act was passed in South Africa, they copied the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Ontario, so he thought of Meredith as
the founder of their system, too.
Meredith was an ideal candidate for commissioner. He had long
experience in the subject, and he was a person without a political future.
In appointing him to conduct the Commission single-handedly, the
government recognized the hazards of interest-group representation on
a Royal Commission. It recognized that an efficient system of public
administration can never be designed or substantially revised by any
process of bargaining or compromise among interest group
representatives. Prevalent among the problems is the propensity for
such bargaining to result in compromises of inclusion. If organized
labour wants the system changed to include this and this; and organized
management wants the system changed to included that and that; the
temptation is there for any government to conclude that the system
should be changed to include this and this, and that and that. Successive
revisions made in that way can make a system too complicated.
In some provinces, the system was revised from time to time by
the appointment of a Royal Commission similar to that of Meredith,3
but after the 1960s, that practice fell into disuse. With those subsequent
royal commissions, as with the first one, the most important role played
by each commissioner was the rejection of most interest-group
proposals. In that way, each commissioner was able to achieve the
paramount goal in the design of any social insurance system; that is,
"keep it simple." It is no surprise that since the appointment of single-
person Royal Commissions fell into disuse, some of our systems of
workers' compensation have become increasingly complex, to the point
of being unwieldy.
3 Probably the best of these was the 1952 report of the commission in British Columbia: British
Columbia, Workmen's Compensation Board Inquiry, Report of the Commissioner, the Hon. Gordon
McG. Sloan, Workmen's Compensation Board Inquiry (1952) (Victoria: Don McDiarmid, Printer to
the Queen, 1952). See also, for example, Manitoba, Commission to Inquire into and Investigate
Every Aspect of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Report of the Commissioner, W.F.A. Turgeon,
the Workmen's Compensation Act, Manitoba, 1958 (Winnipeg: The Commission, 1958).
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In appointing Meredith, the Government of Ontario also
adopted another principle that would seem strange on the contemporary
political stage. The principle was this: before deciding on major system
changes, you should have someone conduct an inquiry into the facts.
II. SCOPE OF THE COVERAGE
It is commonly said in contemporary debate that the coverage of
the system has expanded beyond what was originally intended. It may be
of interest to summarize the extent to which this is so. As a statement of
the original intention, I will take the recommendations of the Meredith
Report, at least to the extent that they were enacted in the first
Workmen's Compensation Act.
A. Coverage by Industry
The range of industries covered by the Acts has expanded in
recent years, but this does not deviate from any original intention.
Meredith recommended that a prescribed list of industries should be
covered, but this list was to serve only as a starting point. It was one of
his recommendations that others could be added later.
B. Types of People
There has been no significant change in the category of people
who are covered. Where an industry is covered by the Acts, all
employees in that industry are generally covered. No use has been made
of the classifications that were subsequently introduced in labour
legislation for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The system has always covered workers of both sexes, but for
many decades it was heavily male-oriented. Women were more readily
recognized as widows than as workers. This male orientation changed
substantially during the seventies, when most governments changed the
name or the system from "workmen's" to "workers'," and women were
hired in substantial numbers at the boards for decision-making roles.
During the eighties, however, the Canadian Charter of Rights and
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Freedoms4 arrived to provide a setback for sex equality. Its predictable
interpretation, at least among those responsible for the preparation of
statutes, demanded sex equality on the face of the statutes, regardless of
how much inequality that produces in the results. So major forms of sex
discrimination remain. The most important shows in the etiological
statistics classified by sex. Among people of normal working age who
become disabled, the proportion of men who were disabled by injury is
significantly higher than the proportion of women who were disabled by
injury.5 Thus, a system that compensates for injury more readily than it
compensates for disease will also be one that compensates the
disabilities of men more readily than the disabilities of women.
C. Types of Disability
There was a consensus at the Meredith inquiry that disabilities
from trauma should be covered. Disabilities from disease were
controversial, with the unions taking the view that they should be
covered, and the Canadian Manufacturers Association taking the view
that they should not. Concerns were raised about the difficulties of
distinguishing between diseases that result from employment and those
that result from other causes, bearing in mind also that many disease
conditions result from multiple etiology. In the result, Meredith
recommended that diseases be covered, but in a more limited way than
injuries.6 The first Workmen's Compensation Act provided for the
coverage of an "industrial disease;" which was defined to mean the
diseases itemized in a schedule to the Act, plus those that would be
declared in future by regulations of the (then) Workmen's
Compensation Board (wcB).7
Other types of disabilities that were subsequently recognized as
covered were:
-those resulting from a sudden strain,
-those resulting from the psychological consequences of trauma,
-those resulting from repetitive strain, and
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
5 See, for example, "Statistics of Disability Pensions Being Paid," October 1992, (Ottawa:
Canada Pension Plan, 1992) Tables A and B.
6 Meredith Report, supra note 1 at 13.
7 Workmen's Compensation Act, supra note 2, s. 2(h).
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-those resulting from the psychological harm of a frightening
experience without trauma.
In more recent years, there has been some recognition of disabilities
resulting from occupational stress, though only in some jurisdictions and
only in a limited way.8
Whether the coverage of these disabilities should be seen as an
expansion of the original intention depends upon which way one looks at
it. They were not a focus of contemporary debate in 1913, and it would
be hard to find in the Meredith Report any expressed intention that they
should be covered. On the other hand, the category of disabilities that
were intended to be covered was defined only by the term "personal
injury." This term was drawn from the common law. It was a term used
in tort liability and it was the term used in the British Workmen's
Compensation Acts.9 Meredith would have expected that when the
boards were deciding on the meaning of this term, they would follow the
decisions of common law courts. The common law, however, is always
evolving; and in the courts, the perception of "personal injury" evolved
to include disabilities resulting from a sudden strain, the psychological
consequences of trauma, repetitive strain, psychological harm without
trauma resulting from a sudden fright, and emotional distress.
This expansion in the common law perception of "personal
injury" is relevant to another important feature of workers'
compensation. It was the original intention that workers' compensation
should be a complete substitute for employers' liability in the industries
to which it applied.10 Thus a benefit for employers of the new system
was to be a complete immunity from employers' liability claims.
Providing that immunity required that the types of disability for which a
worker could claim compensation should be coextensive with the types
of disability for which an employer could be sued at common law. Since
it was the original intention to provide this immunity for employers, it is
a logical corollary that the boards should interpret the phrase "personal
injury" in a way ihat would keep it coextensive with the usage of that
term in the common law courts. On this view, the expansions in the
coverage that have taken place by type of disability are a fulfilment of
the original intention.
8 See, for example, Decision No. 636/91 (1992), 21 W.C.A.T.R. 277 (Ont.). See also K. Lippel,
Le Stress au Travail: l'indemnisation des atteintes ai la sant6 en droit qu~bcois, canadian et amerdcain
(Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1992) at 11-98.
9 See Worlanen's Compensation Act, 1897 (U.K.), 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, s. 1.
10 Meredith Report, supra note 1 at 15.
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These developments were also essential if the system was to
achieve its moral and economic objectives; including good social cost
accounting. These goals required compensation for disabilities that
result from employment. It would have been harder to find a rationale
for covering only disabilities that result from employment in a particular
way.
While decisions of the common law courts were the primary
impetus for this broader perception of "personal injury," it was also
supported by legislative changes, particularly in jurisdictions that
repealed the word "accident" as a requirement of eligibility for
compensation in injury cases and retained that word only as a
requirement for the statutory presumption relating to employment
causation. Ontario rounded the matter off by enacting that the coverage
applies to any "disablement arising out of and in the course of
employment." 11
D. Cause of Disability
It is commonly said that there has been an expansion in the
range of disabilities attributed to employment, and therefore classified
as compensable. This appearance of expansion has been partly real and
partly illusory. The real expansion has come in relation to disabilities of
multiple etiology. These are disabilities that result from the concurrent
or sequential influence of two or more causative factors, not all of which
are events or circumstances of the employment. This expansion is a
concomitant of the expansion that I have already mentioned in the types
of disability that are covered. Questions of multiple etiology are not
generally seen as a problem in traumatic injuries. They are raised in
many cases of disease, strain, psychological disorders, or emotional
stress. Thus, in these types of cases there has been some expansion by
cause of disability.
It does not follow, however, that this is an expansion beyond
what was originally intended. The comments made in relation to type of
disability are also relevant here. In cases of multiple etiology, the
criterion of eligibility commonly used is whether some event or
circumstance of the employment was a significant contributing cause of
the disablement. That always has been the correct legal criterion. All
that has expanded in recent years is the recognition that that is the
correct legal criterion.
11 Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.11, s. 1(c) (definition of "accident").
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The other areas of expansion sometimes alleged with regard to
cause of disablement relate to the burden and standard of proof. Here
again, there has been no significant change in the legal criteria. What
may appear to be a contemporary dispute is the continuation of a
"dispute that has been with us since the system began. For example, a
recent discussion paper1 2 alleging relaxation in the standard of proof
suggests a requirement that employment causation be "clearly"
established. This illustrates the position taken among some employers'
representatives; namely, that employment causation should be
established to a certainty, or to a high degree of probability. Conversely,
it has sometimes been argued by labour representatives that, where
employment causation cannot be ruled out, the possibility of employment
causation should be enough to qualify for compensation.
Neither of those positions was ever adopted in the Royal
Commission reports, nor in the statutes. The general common law rule
(except in criminal cases) is that the standard of proof is the balance of
probabilities. In other words, where the causes of a disability cannot be
determined with any certainty, a board must consider which of the
probabilities is more likely. It must search for the best available
hypothesis. This common law rule, the balance of probabilities,
generally applies to tribunals as well as to courts when the legislature has
not specified any other criterion.
With regard to the burden of proof, workers' compensation in
Canada has always been different from common law proceedings. Our
systems were established to work on an enquiry model, not an
adversarial model. There is no burden of proof on anyone except the
board. Since workers' compensation was not to be adversarial, a rule
was required for situations in which the evidence for and against
employment causation is judged to be evenly balanced. In that situation,
a common law regime would require that the claim be denied; but a
more benevolent view was taken in workers' compensation. It has
commonly been provided that, where the evidence relating to the
disputed probabilities is judged to be evenly balanced, the matter should
be decided in favour of the claimant. That variation of the common law
position has been enacted in some jurisdictions13 and established by
tribunal or board decisions in some others.14 It is sometimes referred to
12 Hon. Cam Jackson, New Directions for Workers' Compensation Reform: Report of the
Honourable Cam Jackson, Minister Without Portfolio Responsible for Workers' Compensation Reform
(Toronto: Minister Without Portfolio, 1996) at 30; and generally at 28-33.
13 For example, Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 492, s. 99.
14 For example, Decision No. 20, (29 June 1988) Nfld. W.C.A.T. at 10 [unreported].
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as giving the worker the benefit of the doubt. It only applies in cases
where the evidence each way is judged to be evenly balanced.
As the administration of workers' compensation was initially
established at the boards, relatively little use was made of lawyers.
Indeed, one of the goals of the Meredith Report was to avoid the cost and
delay of involving the legal profession. It was recognized, however, that
workers' compensation claims would involve medical issues. Doctors
were hired by the boards, and they became the dominant profession in
claims adjudication. The propensity was for staff doctors to become
decision makers, rather than medical advisers. They became decision
makers, not only on questions of medicine, but also on non-medical facts
and questions of law, including the burden and standard of proof. This
dominance of board doctors in claims adjudication resulted in a burden
and standard of proof being applied that were more appropriate to
scientific research than to the determination of legal rights. A positive
answer on employment causation was thought to require a standard of
proof coming close to a certainty, or at least much higher than the
balance of probabilities that was prescribed by law. As a result, the
legally correct standard of proof was submerged for several decades.
It will be appreciated that I am talking here and elsewhere about
the general position. There are exceptions relating to particular types of
cases in some jurisdictions. For example, in a case of non-scheduled
disease in Quebec, a worker has a burden of proving that the disease is
characteristic of his work or directly related to the risks peculiar to that
work.1S
For cases involving multiple etiology, it has often been suggested
that one of the contributing causes should be classified as
"predominant," or "dominant," and compensation paid or denied
according to whether the "predominant" or "dominant" cause was a
feature of the employment. That suggestion has been adopted in some
legislative changes relating to claims for disease. A problem with that
approach is that, where a disability has resulted from the interaction of
two or more causative factors, and it would not have occurred in the
absence of one of them, there is no scientific way in which any one of
them can be classified as "predominant." This classification can only be
made by arbitrary choice or political judgment, and this is so, even if the
decision is allowed to masquerade as a medical opinion. A decision
either way would be hard to justify because it could not be supported by
logical reasoning. The use of this ostensible criterion could also tend to
clog the appeal system.
1 5 Act respecting IndustrialAccidents and Occupational diseases, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-3.001, s. 30.
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Perhaps I should digress for a moment here to say a word about
the eternal dilemma that underlies workers' compensation. The system
was based in the first place on a false assumption. It assumed the
feasibility of distinguishing-fairly, promptly, and
economically-between disabilities that result from employment and
those that do not. It has never been feasible to administer that
distinction efficiently, and it never will be.
The dilemma for policymakers is that if the system were confined
to trauma cases, the determination of employment causation would be
much easier; but the system would not then accord with the primary
rationale for its existence; that is, to achieve good social cost accounting
by containing the cost of occupational disabilities within the industries
that produce them. If the system covers all disabilities that result from
employment, regardless of trauma, this would appear to achieve the
primary goal of good social cost accounting, but it maximizes the
difficulties of proving or disproving employment causation.
Compounding the difficulty of administering the distinction is
the difficulty of justifying it by reference to any public need. The human
need for insurance protection against the risk of disablement or
premature death does not vary according to how it happened. This point
was mentioned recently by the insurance industry in response to
suggestions in Ontario that the coverage should be extended to the
service industries, including insurance. The Insurance Bureau of
Canada made the point that the employees of insurance companies
would rather have insurance coverage for disability regardless of the
cause, as under policies of disability insurance, than coverage that is
limited to disabilities that result from a particular cause.16 This is not
surprising. It is hard to conceive of any reason why anyone would want
disability insurance coverage only in respect of disabilities that result
from a particular cause.
The rationale for workers' compensation relates to cost
distribution, not to compensation needs. That being so, the argument is
profound that insurance coverage for disablement and premature death
should be universal, regardless of the cause. It is perfectly feasible to
design a system that provides that coverage while, at the same time,
preserving cause as a criterion for cost-distribution. 17
16 See Insurance Bureau of Canada, Submission to the Standing Committee [Ontario] on
Resources Development, Public Hearings on Bill 165, An Act to Amend the Workers' Compensation Act
and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Toronto: September 1994) [unpublished].
1 7 See T.G. Ison, Compensation Systems for Injury and Disease: The Policy Choices (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1994) c. 8.
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E. Types of Benefits
Meredith recommended the provision of monetary benefits.
Medical aid was added later. The reason for not providing medical
coverage initially seems strange to those who read current news reports
of health care costs. Meredith felt that the injured worker should be
able to pay for medical care.
F. Level of Benefits
The level of compensation benefits rose over the years in one
way, but declined in another. The rate of compensation for total
disability was originally 55 per cent of the gross wage rate.1 8 In
subsequent decades, this rose to 75 per cent of the gross wage rate. 19 In
more recent years in some jurisdictions, that was converted to 90 per
cent of notional net earnings, and more recently in some jurisdictions,
that has been reduced to 85 per cent or 80 per cent of notional net
earnings. 20 The primary reduction, however, came in the ceiling. The
original ceiling was above the wage rate of the highest paid industrial
worker. It was Meredith's expressed intention that the ceiling should
only curtail compensation for "highly paid managers and
superintendents of establishments."21 The inflation of subsequent
decades took its toll. Even though the ceiling was later adjusted by
statutory changes, and then by indexing, it has always fallen well short of
Meredith's intention. This decline in the ceiling undermined the
insurance character of the system.
III. THE MEASUREMENT OF PERMANENT
PARTIAL DISABILITY
This has always been the most difficult topic in the history of
compensation for disability. It is too complex to discuss at the same time
18 Workmen's Compensation Act, supra note 2, ss. 37,39.
19 For example, Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 505, ss. 39,41 (unamended).
20 For example, in New Brunswick, it is now 80 per cent of notional net earnings for the first
39 weeks of injury, and 85 per cent thereafter: Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13,
s. 38.2(2.1), as am. by S.N.B. 1992, c. 34, s. 12.
21 Meredith Report, supra note 1 at 16.
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as other subjects,22 but I will mention the situation briefly. It was not
well-canvassed in the Meredith Report. After some initial flirting with
compensation by reference to actual loss of earnings, the boards
generally adopted the physical impairment method as the primary way of
compensating for permanent partial disability. An estimated degree of
impairment was determined and expressed as a percentage of total
disability. That percentage rate was then applied to the level of pension
that would have been payable if the worker had been totally disabled.
This method was adopted in all provinces. From time to time, a
province reverted to some version of the actual loss of earnings method,
but it was abandoned when the consequential injustices, costs and
difficulties of administration were rediscovered.
During the last fifteen years, several provinces23 have again
reverted to some version of the actual loss of earnings method, and
again the consequential problems have emerged. A common dilemma
involves a worker who is partially disabled and who cannot obtain any
substantial employment. Either:
a) the principle of compensation for actual loss of earnings is
applied. Full compensation benefits continue to be paid because the
disabled worker cannot obtain employment. There may then be
complaints from employers' representatives that compensation is being
paid as a result of labour market conditions rather than as a result of the
disability; or
b) the worker is deemed to be capable of earning a substantial
income in a phantom job. This is a job that the disabled worker is
physically capable of doing but which he or she will never obtain in a
competitive labour market. Benefits are then terminated; and there are
complaints from labour representatives that compensation is being
denied, notwithstanding that the disability continues, and so does the
consequential loss of earnings.
This illustrates one of the fundamental problems with the actual
loss of earnings method. Whether anyone can obtain employment
always depends upon the interaction of the characteristics of that
person, including any disability, with the state of the labour market. At
times of high unemployment, it is always difficult for disabled people to
22 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see T.G. Ison, "The Calculation of Periodic
Payments for Permanent Disability" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 735.
23 See, for example, Workers' Compensation Act, S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1, ss. 68, 69, as am. by S.S.
1984-85-86, c. 89, s. 15; and S.S. 1993, c. 63, s. 21; Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-3,
s. 49; Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. W-ll, s. 74; and Workers' Compensation Act, S.Y
1992, c. 16, ss. 22, 23.
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obtain jobs, at least those who do not have higher education or special
talents that are in demand. Because of this interaction, most disabled
people unable to obtain employment cannot be classified into those for
whom the lack of employment resulted from the disability and those for
whom it resulted from the state of the labour market. The impossibility
of using such a classification was recognized, explicitly or implicitly, in
the reports of the Royal Commissions that followed the Meredith Report
as well as by the boards. It was a traditional reason for maintaining the
physical impairment method of calculating benefits for permanent
partial disability.
It was also a founding principle of our system, and one that has
generally prevailed that, except in cases of minor disability, pensions for
permanent disability should be payable for as long as the disability lasts.
There have been three rationales for this traditional Canadian position.
First, justice to the injured worker requires that periodic payments for a
permanent disability should last for as long as the disability lasts.
Second, most of the cost of occupational disabilities should be borne as
costs of production, not thrust onto disabled workers and their families,
or onto taxpayers through the welfare budget. Third, workers'
compensation is a substitute for tort liability, and under that system the
calculation of the amount reflects estimated loss of earnings for the
working life of the claimant.
IV. REHABILITATION
Rehabilitation services were not part of the original plan. They
were added later. Rehabilitation services have taken the form of
individual casework by trained rehabilitation personnel. When it was the
economic policy of the federal government to maintain full employment,
these services worked well, at least at some of the boards some of the
time; but the achievement of rehabilitation in this way became
increasingly difficult with the advent of "free trade," greater
"competitiveness," and continuing high levels of unemployment.
The recent trend has been away from individual casework in
favour of promoting rehabilitation by means of legal obligations upon
employers, and economic incentives upon employers and workers.
These techniques of seeking the rehabilitation of disabled workers
appeared to have the attraction that they could be applied on a broad
scale without requiring, at the boards, the training, resources, and
sensitivity needed for individual casework. The difficulty with these
broad-scale methods is that, except to a limited extent in the short-run,
1996]
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they will not work. They will never assure the long-term employment of
disabled people. Where a disabled worker is seen by the employer to be
sufficiently productive that the employer wants to continue the
employment, these techniques of rehabilitation have no value. Where
that is not the case, these techniques are unlikely to prevail in the
long-run against the perceived economic incentive to terminate the
employment. Indeed, some of these techniques may well be
counter-productive in that their use tends to stigmatize disabled workers
as undesirable employees.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF TORT LAW
It was mentioned above that the term "personal injury" was
drawn from court decisions, and that the inclusion within that term of
non-traumatic disabilities was copied in workers' compensation.
Another change in recent decades has been the significance of
the Charter in relation to the statutory bar against common law claims.
Prior to the Charter, a legislature was free to define the statutory bar as it
wished. In practice, common law actions against employers and workers
were generally barred for disabilities that were covered by workers'
compensation. It would have been constitutionally valid, however, for a
legislature to provide that a particular type of disability is not covered by
workers' compensation, and yet that no common law action shall lie in
respect of it. Nowadays, such a provision would be vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.
The point can be illustrated in relation to occupational stress, a
subject of much political controversy, particularly with the likelihood of
increasing stress from "free trade," "globalization," and increasing
"competitiveness." A legislature can provide, if it so wishes, that no
compensation is payable for occupational stress. What is now
questionable is whether a legislature could also provide that no common
law action shall lie against an employer for damages for occupational
stress.
The leading case on the constitutional validity of the statutory
bar is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland. A widow
wanted to sue the employer of her deceased husband for wrongful death,
and, of course, the defence was raised that the claim was barred by the
Workers' Compensation Act.24 The case went to court on a Charter
24 S.N. 1983, c. 48, ss. 32, 34.
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challenge to the validity of the statutory bar. The court decided that the
statutory bar was valid; but in reaching that conclusion, the court said:
The validity of the displacement must be tested by the replacement--"the right to
compensation". If this right is found not to measure up to a point where it can be said
that there is no discrimination or no unreasonableness or unfairness, then the
displacement will have offended s. 15.25
That decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada 2 6 The
resulting position is this: if a legislature wishes to provide that a
particular type of disability is not compensable, it may do so. There
would be no breach of the Charter if the worker is free to pursue an
action for that disability in the common law courts for damages against
the employer., However, if the legislation also prohibits the common law
action, that provision would be vulnerable to constitutional challenge,
and may well be struck down.
There is another aspect of the Newfoundland decision that may
be relevant in this age of retrenchment. The court upheld the statutory
bar by looking at the range and levels of benefits that workers receive
under the Workers' Compensation Act and comparing them with workers'
rights at common law. The court said that this comparison should be
made on an overall or global basis. It should not be done by comparing
the level of workers' compensation benefits with the level of damages at
common law on the facts of a particular case. Based on that comparison,
the court concluded that the workers' compensation benefits were a
reasonable substitute for common law actions. Therefore the statutory
bar was valid.27 This means that if the range or levels of benefits, as they
operate in practice, deteriorate, the argument might be made that they
are no longer comparable to workers' rights at common law; and that
therefore the statutory bar violates the Charter. If that argument
succeeds, employers would require employers' liability insurance as well
as paying workers' compensation assessments.
Two other developments raise the likelihood of this happening.
First, bearing in mind that the case taken to court is likely to be a
sympathetic case, the hasty manner in which benefits and qualification
criteria have sometimes been changed in recent years, without the
changes being preceded by a properly constituted Royal Commission or
any other real study of their significance, might tend to undermine
25 Reference Re Sections 32 and 34 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Nfld.) (1988), 67 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 16 at 35 (Nfld. C.A.) [hereinafter Newfoundland Reference].
26 Reference Re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.
2 7 Newfoundland Reference, supra note 25 at 35-36.
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judicial confidence in the system. Second, several provinces have
changed the rules of legal practice to permit the charging of contingent
percentage fees in personal injury claims. When combined with excess
capacity in the legal profession, this adds to the incentive for lawyers to
challenge the statutory bar.
VI. FUNDING
In recent years, we have heard a great deal of debate and
political rhetoric about funding. A particular board is said to have an
"unfunded liability" of a substantial amount. In Ontario, for example,
the Annual Report of the WCB for 1994 showed an "unfunded liability" of
$11,402,000,001.28
There has been much confusion about what this term "unfunded
liability" really means. It is used to assert or imply that a system is
underfunded, but in relation to what? The usual implication is that a
system should be "fully funded." It should have enough reserves to pay
out all future compensation benefits, rehabilitation assistance, and
medical aid, in respect of all current and past claims. Thus, the mention
of an unfunded liability usually implies that a system is underfunded in
relation to what the level of reserves would be if the system were fully
funded.
Continuing with Ontario as the example, it is interesting to
reflect on how it came to be accepted that the system ought to be fully
funded. The legislation does not include any such requirement. It has
never included such a requirement. When the system was being
designed, Meredith carefully considered the question of funding. The
unions argued for a full-funding requirement while the Canadian
Manufacturers Association argued for current cost financing.2 9
Meredith concluded that there were serious objections to each of these
positions, and he recommended a compromise between them. The level
of reserves should be a matter for the judgment of the WCB, and the
system should be funded only to such extent as the Board might consider
necessary to prevent the passing of undue burdens to future generations
of employers 3 0 That recommendation was enacted, and it has remained
substantially the same to this day.
2 8 Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Annual Report-1994 (Toronto: Communications
and Public Affairs Division, Workers' Compensation Board, 1995) at 15.
2 9 Meredith Report, supra note 1 at 6.
30Ibid. at 7.
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In other jurisdictions, the statutes vary in their prescription of
funding obligations. Commonly a board is required to establish reserves
that will provide full funding for future periodic payments of
compensation, but is not required or permitted to establish reserves for
future rehabilitation costs, medical aid, or lump sum payments. Despite
the prohibition, in most jurisdictions, of funding in relation to some
types of future obligations, and despite the variations in funding
requirements among the various statutes, the practice emerged among
all of the boards of assuming a full funding requirement, and then
declaring an "unfunded liability" when reserves fell short of that
fictitious requirement.
It is not hard to imagine how this came about. Advising the
boards in relation to funding requirements became a function of
actuaries, not of lawyers. Whereas a lawyer would have recognized the
obligation of each board to comply with the legislation by which it was
created, actuaries seem to be trained primarily in the funding principles
that apply to private insurance companies. They transferred those
principles to workers' compensation, regardless of their compatibility
with the legislation that was supposed to govern the behaviour of each
board. In the result, all of the boards appear to have adopted the
principle that they ought to be fully funded, and then they have
portrayed themselves as being "underfunded" or "overfunded" by
reference to that benchmark. Legal objections to the use of that
benchmark were overlooked or brushed aside.
Even to the extent that the statutes require funding, they still do
not require an annual recalculation of the extent to which funding
requirements are being met in respect of past claims, but that became
the standard practice. Each board makes an annual recalculation of the
extent to which it is funded in relation to future obligations on past and
current claims, and then announces the extent of its "unfunded liability,"
or its "surplus." This practice does not seem open to any legal objection,
but neither is it usually a legal obligation.
Sometimes, a crucial question is whether a substantial "unfunded
liability" should be a matter for serious concern; but of course that
question should not be considered at all unless it is first determined that
the reserve requirements have been calculated in accord with the statute
law of the jurisdiction. Whether an unfunded liability should be cause
for concern depends upon what is causing it. Consider two examples.
Example One: a board is functioning close to a state of balance
in its annual operating account and, after providing sufficient reserves to
meet funding requirements for the current year's claims, perhaps it has a
small surplus that is applied to reserves. However, the benefits are
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indexed for inflation, and during the relevant time period, the Consumer
Price Index and interest rates are higher than usual. This can cause an
"unfunded liability" to rise dramatically, but that is not due to the
current year's operations. The "unfunded liability" is a book figure that
arises because the current inflation rate used to re-estimate future
claims costs has risen above the average rate of return that the board is
receiving on its past investments. This type of rise in an "unfunded
liability" is not a matter of concern because it is self-correcting. When
interest rates and the inflation rate decline, that will tend to eliminate
any "unfunded liability" and to create a "surplus" in the reserves.
Example Two: a board has a substantial and rising "unfunded
liability" because it is not raising enough revenue in each year to meet
the obligations which it must provide for during that year. It has a
deficit for several years in its annual operating account. That is
obviously a matter for serious concern that requires corrective action. It
would be a matter of particular concern if a substantial "unfunded
liability" is rising over a period of years during which interest and
inflation rates are unusually low.
The assertion of a full-funding requirement, compliance with
which is measured annually as a benchmark of performance, has become
a diversion from reality in several jurisdictions because of the change
from fixed pensions for permanent disabilities to periodic payments that
are subject to change from time to time by reference to changes in the.
estimated earnings or deemed earnings of the recipients. In jurisdictions
where this change has been made, the lack of fixed pensions makes it
impossible to calculate reserve requirements in a mathematical way.
Because future benefits for permanent disabilities in these jurisdictions
depend upon future judgments, it is impossible to calculate any funding
requirement except by the use of highly speculative assumptions. Thus,
in these jurisdictions, the continued use of a full-funding principle is
open to the objection that it diverts attention from realities to illusions.
In these jurisdictions in particular, but also in the others, it could be
healthier, though politically difficult, to abandon the annual ritual of
re-estimating the funding performance, and focus instead on
maintaining a balance in the annual operating account and a steady level
of reserves.
VII. COST ESCALATION AND WASTE
Over the last twenty years in particular, there have been
significant cost escalations that seem to be unrelated to any benefit
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derived by claimants. This is particularly so if externalized costs are
included. The system has become more adversarial and more
complicated. These features cause delay, with consequential increases in
administrative and compensation costs, as well as impediments to
rehabilitation. These developments have also generated excessive
professionalism in the system; and of course each new profession that
becomes involved brings its own complications, its own interests, and its
own increases in costs. Another cause may have been the expansion in
the range of service-providers, coinciding as it has with the ideology of
deregulation. This may have made it more difficult for the boards to
control over-servicing in health care and rehabilitation.
VIII. PRIVATIZATION
When Meredith designed our first workers' compensation
system, there was no question of it being administered by the insurance
industry. Management and labour groups both wanted a system of
insurance administered by a government board. Also, Meredith saw
insurance companies, lawyers, and courts as parts of the problem.31 The
solution had to be one that required their exclusion. This model of a
government board was copied and prevailed throughout all of the
provinces, though insurance companies were used for a while in the
territories.
For the next seventy years, there does not seem to have been any
serious effort by the insurance industry to enter workers' compensation
in the provinces of Canada. Over the past five years, however, portions
of the insurance industry have shown changing expectations, and there is
now a campaign for "privatization." The reasons for this are not entirely
clear, at least not to me, but they may include the following:
1) The success of Chicago School ideology on the political scene
has promoted an overriding faith in market theory that distracts from
rational analysis about the significance of markets, their values, and their
limitations, in particular contexts.
31 This is more implicit in the conclusions than it is explicit in the reasoning of the Meredith
Report, but it receives a passing mention: ibid. at 5 and 12.
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2) When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA) 3 2
replaced the Free Trade Agreement33 and expanded it to include the
service industries, this seems to have been seen by some American
insurance companies as a possible opportunity to administer in Canada
the same kind of workers' compensation coverage as they administer in
the United States. Also, the resulting political climate has created
downward pressures on benefits, including the duration of benefits for
permanent disability, and this may make the system more attractive to
insurance companies.
3) Taking over the administration of workers' compensation
could be another possible springboard for a takeover of health insurance
in general.
In speaking about "privatization" here, I am referring only to the
monetary benefits and health care. "Privatization" in relation to
rehabilitation services would involve different issues, and it would be a
separate topic.
The only arguments that I have heard so far in support of
"privatization" are, quite frankly, superficial or irrelevant. Some of the
arguments are simply ideological generalizations that do not reflect any
depth of understanding in relation to compensation for human
disablement. Others use misleading numbers. For example, one can
hear it said that the average rate of premium paid by employers in some
American state, where the system is administered by insurance
companies, is X-amount less than the average rate of assessment paid in
some Canadian province. Assuming that to be true, such a statement
tells us nothing about why the average rate of premium there is lower
than the average rate of assessment here. Perhaps the benefits are
lower, or perhaps the industries covered there involve lower risks than
those covered here. Also, such a simple comparison does not count the
greater externalized costs under a system administered by insurance
companies.
Almost certainly, the given American state does not provide
employers with the same immunity from tort liability as we do here. The
limitations on their workers' compensation coverage may be producing
higher insurance costs for employers in another form. Even if the state
is one in which a company has no significant risk of tort claims from its
32 North American Free Trade Agreement: between the Government of Canada, the Government
of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, 17 December 1992,
Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2.
33 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States ofAmerica, 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3.
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own employees, it would still be exposed to the risk of tort claims by the
workers of other employers. For Canadian employers, the risks of
causing injury to the worker of another employer are usually covered by
workers' compensation. So the compensation cost of such injuries in
Canada is reflected in workers' compensation assessments. In the
American state, the compensation costs of such injuries might be
reflected in the premium paid for liability insurance.
I do not have any detailed familiarity with cost distribution in
relation to occupational disabilities in the American states as between
different types of insurance, but I believe that I have said enough to
illustrate the point. A simple comparison of an average workers'
compensation insurance premium in some American state with an
average workers' compensation assessment in some Canadian province
(even if the "average" is calculated in a comparable way) tells us nothing
about the significance of administration by insurance companies
compared with administration by a government board. If proper studies
were made of comparative costs, using an appropriate and tight
methodology, they would almost certainly show that administration by a
government board is generally cheaper.
A more persuasive argument for privatization could probably be
developed around the inefficiencies that have sometimes resulted from
the failure of some politicians to insulate workers' compensation boards
from political pressures.
The reasons why Canada has preferred to have workers'
compensation administered by a government board have been
mentioned in various places over the years, but I have never found them
gathered in one place. It may be useful, therefore, to list what those
reasons are.
1. The first priority in this subject area is surely occupational
health and safety. A responsible approach by government to
occupational health and safety must be eclectic, and the techniques used
must include sanctions for non-compliance with regulations, or unduly
hazardous conditions. The only efficient sanction that is available for
use in any broad range of situations is the penalty assessment based on
observed conditions, as used in British Columbia. The insurance
industry cannot offer anything comparable, except to some extent in
those industries for which it is feasible to conduct a survey before writing
the coverage, and repeat surveys later.
2. A workers' compensation board is not only an insurer, but also
a tribunal, with a public law duty to adjudicate each claim fairly,
impartially, and according to law. That status cannot be conferred
constitutionally upon any business corporation. Thus, in any system
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administered by insurance companies, the first level of adjudication is
the courts, or a specialized tribunal. Primary adjudication is then in an
adversarial system, which increases cost and delay. To avoid those
consequences, bargaining processes are commonly used, but the
negotiations do not take place between parties in an equal bargaining
position. One of the traditional goals of the Canadian structure has
been to save injured workers from bargaining processes by providing
instead a system of prompt adjudication. It was also one of Meredith's
goals that an injured worker should not be harassed "by compelling him
to litigate his claim in a court of law .... 34
3. It is more conducive to rehabilitation if a disabled worker is
brought into personal contact quickly with an adjudicator who has a duty
of impartial adjudication and a close connection with a rehabilitation
consultant. It is least conducive to rehabilitation if a disabled worker has
a perceived need to look his or her worst at a date in the distant future
for the "day in court."
4. An insurance company system creates costs that are not
incurred in a government system. These items of extra cost include
marketing costs, profit, and taxes. For most jurisdictions, the profit
component of cost would also represent a drainage of money out of the
province or territory. There would also be additional costs to ensure
that employers are complying with the compulsory coverage
requirements. An insurance company system also requires a regulatory
structure administered by government, and that would be another
additional cost. Also, economies of scale might be lost through the
multiplicity of administering agencies. It is also understandable that
insurance companies tend to prefer lower-level risks. In systems
administered by insurance companies, it is often found that certain
employers in higher risk categories have difficulty in obtaining insurance.
Of course, that problem can be overcome. Some sort of pooling system
can be developed for covering the employers that no insurance company
would otherwise want to cover; but such an arrangement is another extra
cost.
5. The value and limitations of an insurance market vary with
different types of insurance. Since workers' compensation coverage
would be compulsory in any event for most employers, an insurance
company system would require a statutory form of policy. Neither
employers nor workers would, therefore, derive one of the primary
benefits of a market; that is, choice of product for the consumer.
3 4 Meredith Report, supra note 1 at 12.
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6. There would be the problem of who is going to select the
insurer for each enterprise. In jurisdictions that use insurance
companies, it is generally the employer. Workers do not usually
participate in the choice. Yet it is part of traditional market theory that
markets work most efficiently when the consumer or user of a product
can select the supplier. This helps to explain why some types of
insurance administered by insurance companies seem to work much
more efficiently than other types.
7. Insurance companies seem to operate with a high level of
efficiency in the administration of weekly indemnity insurance, and with
regard to short-term claims under long-term disability policies, though
claims of those types do not involve the complexities of workers'
compensation. Insurance companies do not have the same track record
of efficiency in the administration of long-term claims under long-term
disability policies. Judging from the law reports and complaints at
agencies advising disabled people, long-term disability insurance in cases
of permanent disability appears to involve more controversies than any
other type of insurance (with the possible exception of liability
insurance).
8. The introduction of insurance companies, brokers and
actuarial firms into workers' compensation would bring large and
powerful interest groups into the system. To the political power that
they have already, there would be added the power that derives from
constant presence and interactions, the development of experience, and
the consequential claim to expertise. The problem with this is that the
interests of the insurance industry in the ongoing operation and
development of the system would not always coincide with the interests
of employers, workers, or taxpayers.
9. Related to this last point, the insurance industry and the
litigation bar go hand in glove. A social insurance system can operate
efficiently without much involvement of lawyers, at least if it operates
without experience-rating; but an insurance company system cannot
operate without the use of lawyers for advocacy in claims adjudication,
and in appeals. This heavy involvement of lawyers adds to the cost of
processing individual claims. Less obviously, it adds to the overall cost
of the system in other ways. First, it brings onto the scene yet another
interest group to demand that its needs be accommodated in subsequent
system development, and it is another powerful group with interests that
will not always coincide with the interests of employers, workers, or
taxpayers. Second, the use of courts and the doctrine of precedent mean
that the law of the system evolves in the context of particular cases, and
that the law is developed by a disparate array of people who are
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commonly unfamiliar with what is needed to process claims in bulk.
Inevitably, this makes the law of the system more complicated, more
refined, more uncertain, and more expensive to administer.
10. Apart from its public law duty of fairness and impartiality in
individual claims, a government board may properly be seen as having a
more general duty to act in the public interest by taking account of other
public policy objectives. An insurance company has no such duty. This
is critical in workers' compensation, bearing in mind that one goal of the
system has always been to protect the welfare budget from the cost of
occupational disabilities;3S The boards traditionally were conscious of
this, and it was one reason they generally maintained a restrictive
posture in relation to the commutation of pensions in cases of significant
permanent disability. Insurance company systems have often favoured
lump sum pay-outs. Another example might be seen in relation to
rehabilitation. If a government board is mindful of the public interest, it
will try to achieve vocational rehabilitation in an occupation that is likely
to last, and that will not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of
the worker, or other workers. The economic interest of an insurance
company in vocational rehabilitation may not go beyond the placement
of a worker in a job.
11. Over the last twenty-five years, it has come to be recognized
by several of the compensation boards in Canada that decentralization is
essential to efficiency. Local personal contact between the adjudicator
and the worker, employer, physicians, and union officials is most
conducive to speed and accuracy in claims adjudication, and to
rehabilitation, as well as to the prevention of fraud. It would become
more difficult to divide the total caseload geographically if it is divided
among different insurance companies.
12. The choice of insurance structure may also be, to some
extent, a choice of benefit structure. In workers' compensation in
Canada, it has been normal for most benefits to be a matter of statutory
right, but there have also been some discretionary benefits, particularly
for rehabilitation. It is more difficult to have discretionary benefits in a
system administered by insurance companies and, if they are found, it is
only reasonable to expect that they will be administered in the economic
interests of the insurer, which may or may not coincide with the public
interest.
13. Workers' compensation benefits are not taxable income.
Historically, this is not clearly traceable to a single rationale, but the
influences that produced this result might have included a loose
35 See, for example, ibid. at 14 and 17.
[VOL. 34 No. 4
Historical Perspective on Workers' Compensation
association of workers' compensation benefits with notions of crown
immunity. If the benefits were seen to come from insurance companies,
there might be some risk of Revenue Canada taking the opportunity to
make them taxable. If that happened, either the premiums would be
increased dramatically to achieve the same level of net benefits, or there
would be a drastic cut in net benefit levels. Either way, employers or
workers would have to bear the extra cost of this drain-off to Revenue
Canada.
14. Since the WCBS provide health care (medical aid),
privatization would expand the role of the insurance industry in relation
to health care. At the moment, insurance companies provide what might
be called supplementary coverage; but any takeover of the WCB role
would move the industry into what might be called primary coverage.
There might be apprehensions, therefore, that this expansion could
threaten the broader public health care system.
15. Any switch to an insurance company system would probably
increase the range and numbers of employers who would claim an
exemption from compulsory insurance and a right to be self-insured.
Given the contemporary pace of change in technology and in markets, as
well as the political pressures, it would be difficult for any government to
make a rational judgment on which, among those so claiming, could be
relied upon to meet their financial commitments indefinitely into the
future. Resistance to such claims could be politically impossible while
acquiescence in them could produce additional costs for future
employers or future taxpayers.
16. The necessity for marketing, coupled with the contemporary
emphasis on "competitiveness," would bring into workers' compensation
a group of executives whose specialty is marketing. The talent for
promotion that is a part of that role can also be used for self-promotion,
with the result that marketing executives can tend to rise in a corporate
pyramid proportionately more than others. Thus, in an insurance
company system, there would be a risk of some cEos being drawn from a
background in marketing, rather than in production, systems, services, or
one of the professions. A background in marketing is less conducive to
efficiency in systems and service delivery.
It will be appreciated that this list of reasons for having workers'
compensation administered by a government board does not attempt a
judgment on the cogency of each reason. That would require further
elaboration and enquiry.
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As an alternative to having the system administered by a
government board or by insurance companies, it is sometimes suggested
that there could be some sort of halfway house. For example, a workers'
compensation board could retain the overall responsibility for the
system, but the function of claims administration could be delegated to
certain insurance companies. Arrangements on these lines have been
tried in Australia, with the state of Victoria having had the most
experience. In Australia, however, this was not, for the most part, a
move towards privatization. It was not a move towards insurance
companies because of dissatisfaction with administration by a
government board. Except for some recent back-tracking in South
Australia, it was a move towards a government agency because of
dissatisfaction with administration of the system by insurance companies.
There are serious problems with the idea of a halfway house.
Some of the problems that I have mentioned above in relation to an
insurance company system would still apply to this structure. For
example, a company that is making decisions on a claim can hardly be
considered impartial if it is selected by one party to that claim? Such a
structure would also have problems of its own. For example, how could
one devise a payment formula that would provide an economic incentive
for an insurance company to make the right response to each claim. If
an insurance company is simply paid a fee per case, there would be an
economic incentive to close the file on each claim as soon as possible,
with an obvious risk of serious injustice to injured workers. If that
problem is avoided by paying the insurance company a fee for each
month that a file is open, there could be an economic incentive to keep
each claim going for as long as possible, with an obvious risk of waste.
Perhaps some proposal might emerge for a halfway house that
would avoid these and other problems, but I have not seen such a
proposal so far, nor have I seen any credible argument in support of this
structure.
IX. CONCLUSION
It may be of interest to reflect on what Meredith might have said
if he had been able to see our workers' compensation systems as they
operate today. Perhaps he would be pleased that they have survived,
that they have served the nation as well as they have, and that they have
served as an international model.
On two major points, however, I think Meredith would have
been disappointed by developments of the last twenty years. First, some
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of our workers' compensation systems have been allowed to become far
too complicated. The first principle of efficiency in the design of any
social insurance system is "keep it simple." There has been a loss of
adherence to that principle. Second, the view that major system changes
should be preceded by principled and analytical inquiry has been largely
discarded. Governments abandoned the practice of conducting such
inquiries by the use of a properly constituted Royal Commission. Some
have substituted the making of major system changes in response to
interest group pressures without the intervention of a fact-finding
inquiry or rational analysis, or they have conducted only token enquiries.
Sometimes they have made major changes in a way that can fairly be
described as flippant, or as government by fumble and tumble. Perhaps
the memory of Meredith will remind us that it is possible to do better.

